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THE POLITICS OF 
UNFEELING
Joe Rollins
Affect and American Literature in 
the Age of Neoliberalism by Rachel 
Greenwald Smith. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 
2015. 194 pp. Hardback: $102.00
In the years since the 2011 occupa-
tion of Wall Street by anticonsum-
erist activists, a palpable sense of 
positivity has saturated left-wing 
politics. This tenor has shaped 
a variety of contemporary pro-
gressive campaigns, from Jeremy 
Corbyn’s “politics of hope” and 
Bernie Sanders’s invigorating push 
for the Democratic Party nomi-
nation to the work of the popular 
antifascist organization HOPE not 
Hate. Against this cultural back-
drop, however, there remain those 
critics of literature and visual arts 
who maintain an interest in the 
progressive political possibilities 
inherent in less palatable branches 
of affective experience: feeling bad, 
feeling nothing, or feeling some-
thing indefinable but recognizably 
unsettling. In 2015, three publi-
cations looked to the possibilities 
that artworks generative of typi-
cally “negative” affects might have 
for producing political change. 
Hal Foster’s republished essay 
“Abjection” in his book Bad New 
Days, Nikolaj Lubecker’s study 
The Feel-Bad Film, and the topic 
of this review, Rachel Greenwald 
Smith’s monograph Affect and 
American Literature in the Age of 
Neoliberalism all consider the role 
that traditionally “negative” affect 
might play in reconfiguring and 
resisting the hegemonic experience 
of neoliberal subjectivity.
In Affect and American Literature 
in the Age of Neoliberalism, Smith 
sets out to challenge what she terms 
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“the affective hypothesis,” defined 
as “the belief that literature is at its 
most meaningful when it represents 
and transmits the emotional speci-
ficity of personal experience” (1). In 
the context of neoliberalism, Smith 
argues, this hypothesis has been 
transfigured into a contract between 
author and reader, wherein the lat-
ter demands of the former a tan-
gible affective payout in return for 
a temporary emotional investment. 
This payout comes in the form of 
“personal feelings,” which are pri-
vate and recognizable and can be 
networked for further individual 
gain. For Smith, this formulation 
is strictly compatible with the neo-
liberal injunction to draw all forms 
of human behavior under the ambit 
of the market. In short, for Smith, 
reading has become transactional. 
Against these personal feelings and 
the contract model of reading on 
which they depend, Smith offers an 
alternative in the form of “imper-
sonal feelings.” These are feelings 
that are unpredictable and difficult 
to codify, and works that gener-
ate them are frequently labeled as 
“cerebral” or “cold.” Drawing on 
key theorists of affect including 
Deleuze and Massumi, Smith sets 
out to describe how impersonal feel-
ings generated by works of “cold” 
literature can catalyze “attitudinal 
states that suggest alternatives to the 
apparent permanence of the neolib-
eral status quo” (29).
Smith structures her book 
around a series of close readings 
organized into four thematically 
arranged chapters. Smith’s case 
studies are acknowledged by the 
author herself to be a mixed cohort 
with few generic or generational 
affinities but are instead grouped 
by their shared experimentalism. 
In each chapter, she presents two of 
these case studies in tandem, with 
one example representing complic-
ity with the affective hypothesis 
and one successfully challenging it: 
Paul Auster generates impersonal 
feelings, while Cormac McCarthy 
generates personal ones; Jonathan 
Safran Foer narrates the events of 
September 11 from a perspective 
complicit with neoliberal hege-
mony, while Laird Hunt man-
ages to draw attention to the “deep 
entanglement” occluded by narra-
tives such as Foer’s; Dave Eggers 
generates a false sense of agency 
contiguous with neoliberal subjec-
tivity, while Ben Marcus curtails 
and subverts this same illusion of 
autonomy; and Lydia Millet fails 
where Richard Powers succeeds to 
write an ecological narrative that 
neither domesticates wildness nor 
fails entirely to accommodate non-
capitalist life in literary representa-
tion. Several theses thread through 
these chapters: a wariness of 
manipulative sentiment and overt 
appeals to empathy; a celebration of 
feelings that resist easy codification 
(such as unease or “metafeeling”); 
an attendant resistance to illusions 
of agency, control, and systemic 
representation; and an interest in 
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alternative systems for the circu-
lation of both affects and the lit-
erary objects that generate them, 
most arrestingly in the form of the 
ecosystem.
In Smith’s first chapter, she 
pits Cormac McCarthy’s The 
Road against Paul Auster’s Book 
of Illusions, arguing that the emo-
tional economy of McCarthy’s stark 
novel reflects the neoliberal belief 
that “extra-economic activities obey 
the same logic as market activities” 
(45). Auster’s book, contrastingly, 
focuses its efforts on metafeel-
ings—feelings about feeling—
which lend a cerebral detachedness 
to a narrative that one would ordi-
narily expect to be highly melo-
dramatic. Circumventing this 
emotional economy allows Auster 
to stage a resistance to neoliberal 
logic, whereas McCarthy becomes 
complicit. This is a cogently argued 
and forceful start to the book, and 
Smith admirably blends insightful 
close readings with dexterous theo-
retical work as she analyzes the two 
novels. The chapter also ends with 
an important disclaimer for those 
readers coming to Smith’s work 
looking for a blueprint for how lit-
erature might stage a practical resis-
tance to neoliberal policy. Smith 
qualifies that impersonal artworks 
are not explicitly critical of neolib-
eralism; rather, the way they oper-
ate “complicates the fundamental 
expectations of neoliberalism by 
placing a focus on aspects of life 
that fall outside its structures” (59). 
That is, they disregard personal 
investment and return, they deper-
sonalize and deindividualize, and 
they break their “contracts” and are 
thus not easily incorporated into a 
market model of reading and con-
sumption. The question is never 
whether a work is pro- or antineo-
liberal but rather whether it is com-
plicit in allowing neoliberal values 
to go unchallenged. Auster’s work, 
therefore, is not antineoliberal; it 
is just not neoliberal. Whether this 
is good enough for Smith’s read-
ers, I suspect, will depend on their 
preexisting position vis-à-vis the 
relationship between politics and 
aesthetics.
Smith’s chapters skip along at a 
brisk pace, and the snappy, mostly 
dejargoned prose is pleasurable to 
read—a slightly ironic observa-
tion given the object of Smith’s 
critique. Such neatness is less pal-
atable when it comes to the struc-
ture of the book, however. The 
“good book versus bad book” tem-
plate that Smith adheres to for the 
duration of the study occasionally 
feels needlessly schematic, and her 
inflexibility leads to some stretched 
close readings and moments of 
tenuous critical insight. The sec-
ond, arguably weakest, chapter 
of the book is a good example of 
this problem. Focusing on the lit-
erature of September 11, Smith 
arrays Jonathan Safran Foer’s 
Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close 
against Laird Hunt’s The Exquisite. 
Representing September 11 is 
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highly problematic, Smith suggests, 
because “doing so tends to either 
exceptionalize U.S. deaths or tes-
tify to the rupturing force of the 
event, either of which simply rein-
forces dominant political positions” 
(70). It is into this pitfall that Smith 
sees Foer falling, his narrative 
privileging the event to a degree 
that supports its neoliberal instru-
mentalization. In contrast, Hunt 
challenges this dominant represen-
tation precisely by not represent-
ing September 11 in his novel set 
in New York in September 2001. 
Added to this formal elision, Smith 
reads an exchange between two 
characters concerning the herring-
fishing industry as a broken meta-
phor for the event—purposefully 
broken, that is, to signify the “miss-
ing element” in conventional rep-
resentations of September 11. This 
is a plausible—if shaky—reading; 
but Smith stops here, and I found 
myself wanting a more thorough 
analysis of Hunt’s novel in support 
of Smith’s thesis. The rigid struc-
ture of “good” versus “bad” book 
relies on deep and nuanced criti-
cal analysis, and here and in other 
places in the book Smith sacrifices 
this depth, I suspect, in favor of 
maintaining the neatness of her 
structure.
Smith’s unwillingness to apply 
pressure to the structure of her 
book also leads to some critical 
gaps in her account of affect. At 
the book’s most fundamental level, 
Affect and American Literature is an 
argument against overt empathy. 
But Smith offers little concession 
to the productiveness of empathy 
or to other equally codifiable, but 
no less potentially valuable, affects. 
Where, for example, is the discus-
sion of feminist authors such as 
Kathy Acker, whose own experi-
mental literature is grounded in 
a palpable state of rage, or Chris 
Kraus, whose novel I Love Dick 
reflects the author’s highly suc-
cessful attempt to make the politi-
cal personal? Likewise, while the 
sort of affects Smith champions 
have their defenders, the affective 
hypothesis she rejects has also itself 
been harnessed to a position of anti-
neoliberalism in, for example, the 
work of critics such as Adam Kelly, 
whose focus on the group of authors 
associated with the New Sincerity 
movement demonstrates the resis-
tant potential of novels that elicit a 
faith-based contractual agreement 
from their readers.1 Smith’s book 
would have perhaps benefited 
from sacrificing some of the neat-
ness of her structure in favor of a 
somewhat looser framework more 
capable of accommodating these 
alternative ideas.
If the second chapter of Smith’s 
work is arguably its weakest, Affect 
and American Literature more than 
makes up for early shortcomings 
in its later chapters. For the book’s 
final case study, Smith looks to the 
genre of environmental writing. As 
with September 11 novels, Smith 
suggests that writers tackling the 
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topic of ecology face a challenge: a 
paradoxical state whereby, on the 
one hand, an attempt to place an 
ecosystem into a human narrative 
risks domesticating the wild’s wild-
ness and thus the very thing that 
freights it with resistant potential 
and, on the other, failing to assimi-
late the ecosystem at all leads to a 
capitulation to the impossibility of 
representing nonhuman, noncapi-
talist experience in literature. For 
Smith, Lydia Millet’s novel How 
the Dead Dream fails to resolve 
this paradox, its inability to sub-
ordinate the human narrative at 
the center of the novel leading 
to a resolution in which the text 
seems to conclude that “story and 
ecological consciousness . . . are, at 
root, incompatible” (104). Richard 
Powers’s The Echo Maker, on the 
other hand, successfully balances a 
human narrative with a nonhuman 
one, ceding certain perspectives to 
nonhuman actors and mirroring 
an alternative form for the novel in 
which linear progression is subli-
mated under an erratic and unpre-
dictable ecology of effects and 
affects. Smith convincingly argues 
that in Powers’s novel, as in Karen 
Tei Yamashita’s Tropic of Orange, 
which Smith briefly analyzes in her 
introduction to Affect and American 
Literature, a literary form mod-
eled on the ecological offers real 
possibilities to “catalyz[e] unlikely 
changes in readers, and provok[e] 
physical responses with unpredict-
able results” (124). These effects are 
loosely conceived—perhaps under-
standably so given that Smith is try-
ing to work with affects that are by 
their nature uncodifiable; but the 
story she tells here and through-
out Affect and American Literature 
provides a convincing foundation 
for future study, and I do not doubt 
that it will prove an influential and 
widely cited text in years to come.
Yet Smith’s work also brings up 
larger questions about how we, as 
critics, are to engage with neoliber-
alism. At the end of her third chap-
ter, Smith places Bruno Latour 
in opposition to Fredric Jameson 
and his famous concept of cogni-
tive mapping. Smith problematizes 
Jameson’s vision of an art capable 
of cognitively mapping a reader’s 
place in the global capitalist sys-
tem by drawing attention to this 
theory’s congruences with a neolib-
eral belief in an unfettered personal 
agency that is in actuality illusive. 
Complexity means any cognitive 
map will be necessarily imperfect, 
and so the illusion of agency that 
such mapping confers can, for 
Smith, only be damaging. To sup-
port her argument, Smith deploys 
Latour’s critique of artworks that 
attempt to “trace” network con-
nections. For Latour, any such 
endeavor will naturally be reduc-
tive and generative of a false sense 
of autonomy. What is far more rad-
ically potent, for both Smith and 
Latour, is for artworks to shatter 
these false illusions of autonomy on 
which so many of neoliberalism’s 
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claims rest. This, for Smith, is the 
ultimate power of “impersonal 
feelings.” These feelings resist mas-
tery and control, frustrate attempts 
at self-location, and force a con-
frontation with our limitations as 
actors embedded within a complex 
system. Only from the perspective 
of recognition can complicity then 
be rejected and challenge mounted.
Here Smith’s broader claims 
become problematic. Smith’s vision 
of an individual agent’s limited 
knowledge of the complex eco-
nomic system sounds surprisingly 
reminiscent of Friedrich Hayek’s 
knowledge problem, with which 
the economist justified his vision of 
a neoliberal free market. To submit, 
as Smith does, to this neoliberal-
endorsed concept of the market as 
an unfathomably complex system 
seems, to me, somewhat defeatist. 
Likewise, to reject positive affect 
in favor of coldness and cerebral-
ity feels at times like a form of sur-
render and prompts the question, 
might we not wish to claim back 
affect from neoliberalism, rather 
than allow it to be taken? In a dis-
cussion of the concept of self-care 
as a neoliberal conspiracy, Sara 
Ahmed notes that “neoliberal-
ism sweeps up too much when all 
forms of self-care become symp-
toms of neoliberalism.” In the same 
discussion, she remarks that “talk-
ing about personal feelings is not 
necessarily about deflecting atten-
tion from structures.”2 Ahmed’s 
point is that allowing neoliberalism 
to infect something as potentially 
generative as self-care or affect, and 
to operate as if this is an intractable 
truth, is to ultimately become com-
plicit in that project.
Smith’s book, then, is vital read-
ing for its inventive exploration of 
neoliberalism as a formal problem 
but even more so as an entry point 
into the problem of the very pos-
sibility of critique under neolib-
eralism. Smith’s monograph begs 
the question, is the critical work 
of the future about recognition or 
reclamation? Further scholarly 
work will be necessary to answer 
this question, but that work will 
undoubtedly owe a great debt to 
the rigorous and engaging founda-
tion that Smith has built with Affect 
and American Literature in the Age 
of Neoliberalism.
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